Sion's minimax theorem and Nash equilibrium of symmetric multi-person zero-sum game by Satoh, Atsuhiro & Tanaka, Yasuhito
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Sion’s minimax theorem and Nash
equilibrium of symmetric multi-person
zero-sum game
Atsuhiro Satoh and Yasuhito Tanaka
26 December 2017
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/83484/
MPRA Paper No. 83484, posted 26 December 2017 08:49 UTC
Sion’s minimax theorem and Nash equilibrium of
symmetric multi-person zero-sum game∗∗
Atsuhiro Satoha,∗, Yasuhito Tanakab,∗∗
aFaculty of Economics, Hokkai-Gakuen University, Toyohira-ku, Sapporo, Hokkaido, 062-8605,
Japan.
bFaculty of Economics, Doshisha University, Kamigyo-ku, Kyoto, 602-8580, Japan.
Abstract
About a symmetric multi-person zero-sum game we will show the following re-
sults.
(1) The existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium is proved by the Glicksberg
fixed point theorem.
(2) Sion’s minimax theorem and the coincidence of the maximin strategy and
the minimax strategy are proved by the existence of a symmetric Nash equi-
librium.
(3) The existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium is proved by Sion’s mini-
max theorem and the coincidence of the maximin strategy and the minimax
strategy.
If a zero-sum game is asymmetric, maximin strategies and minimax strategies
of players do not correspond to Nash equilibrium strategies. However, if it is
symmetric, the maximin strategies and the minimax strategies constitute a Nash
equilibrium. With only the minimax theorem there may exist an asymmetric equi-
librium in a symmetric multi-person zero-sum game.
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1. Introduction
We consider the relation between Sion’s minimax theorem for a continuous
function and the existence of Nash equilibrium in a symmetric multi-person zero-
sum game. We will show the following results.
(1) The existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium is proved by the Glicksberg
fixed point theorem.
(2) Sion’s minimax theorem and the coincidence of the maximin strategy and
the minimax strategy are proved by the existence of a symmetric Nash equi-
librium.
(3) The existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium is proved by Sion’s mini-
max theorem and the coincidence of the maximin strategy and the minimax
strategy.
An example of such a game is a relative profit maximization game in a Cournot
oligopoly. Suppose that there are n ≥ 3 firms in an oligopolistic industry. Let pii
be the absolute profit of the i-th firm. Then, its relative profit is
pii = pii − 1
n − 1
n∑
j=1, j,i
p¯i j.
We see
n∑
i=1
pii =
n∑
i=1
p¯ii − 1
n − 1(n − 1)
n∑
j=1
pi j = 0.
Thus, the relative profit maximization game in a Cournot oligopoly is a zero-
sum game2. If the oligopoly is asymmetric because the demand function is not
symmetric (in a case of differentiated goods) or firms have different cost func-
tions (in both homogeneous and differentiated goods cases), maximin strategies
and minimax strategies of firms do not correspond to Nash equilibrium strate-
gies. However, if the demand function is symmetric and the firms have the same
cost function, the maximin strategies and the minimax strategies constitute a Nash
equilibrium. With only the minimax theorem there may exist an asymmetric equi-
librium in a symmetric multi-person zero-sum game.
In Section 3 we will show the main results, and in Section 4 we present an
example of an asymmetric n-person zero-sum game.
2About relative profit maximization under imperfect competition please see Matsumura, Mat-
sushima and Cato (2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2014a), Satoh and Tanaka
(2014b), Tanaka (2013a), Tanaka (2013b) and Vega-Redondo (1997)
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2. The model and Sion’s minimax theorem
Consider a symmetric n-person zero-sum game with n ≥ 3 as follows. There
are n players, 1, 2, . . . , n. The set of players is denoted by N. A vector of strategic
variables is (s1, s2, . . . , sn) ∈ S 1 × S 2 × · · · × S n. S i is a convex and compact set in
a linear topological space for each i ∈ N. The payoff functions of the players are
ui(s1, s2, . . . , sn) for i ∈ N. We assume
ui for each i ∈ N is continuous and quasi-concave on S i for each
s j ∈ S j, j ∈ N, j , i. It is continuous and quasi-convex on S j for
j ∈ N, j , i for each si ∈ S i.
Symmetry of a game means that all players have the same payoff function and in
the payoff function of each Player i, Players j and k, j, k , i, are interchangeable.
If the game is symmetric and zero-sum, we have
n∑
i=1
ui(s1, s2, . . . , sn) = 0, (1)
for given (s1, s2, . . . , sn). Also all S i’s are identical. Denote them by S .
Sion’s minimax theorem (Sion (1958), Komiya (1988), Kindler (2005)) for
a continuous function is stated as follows.
Lemma 1. Let X and Y be non-void convex and compact subsets of two linear
topological spaces, and let f : X × Y → R be a function that is continuous and
quasi-concave in the first variable and continuous and quasi-convex in the second
variable. Then
max
x∈X
min
y∈Y f (x, y) = miny∈Y maxx∈X f (x, y).
We follow the description of this theorem in Kindler (2005).
Suppose that sk ∈ S k for all k ∈ N other than i and j, j , i, are given. Denote a
vector of such sk’s by s−i, j. Then, ui(s1, s2, . . . , sn) is written as ui(si, s j, s−i, j), and
it is a function of si and s j. We can apply Lemma 1 to such a situation, and get the
following lemma.
Lemma 2. Let j , i, and S i and S j be non-void convex and compact subsets of
two linear topological spaces, and let ui : S i × S j → R given s−i, j be a function
that is continuous and quasi-concave on S i and continuous and quasi-convex on
S j. Then
max
si∈S i
min
s j∈S j
ui(si, s j, s−i, j) = min
s j∈S j
max
si∈S i
ui(si, s j, s−i, j).
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We assume that arg maxsi∈S i mins j∈S j ui(si, s j, s−i, j) and arg mins j∈S j maxsi∈S i ui(si, s j, s−i, j)
are single-valued for any pair of i and j. By the maximum theorem they are con-
tinuous in s−i, j.
Since we consider a symmetric game, by Lemma 2 we can assume that when
s−i, j = s−k,l,
max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j) = max
sk∈S
min
sl∈S
uk(sk, sl, s−k,l)
= min
sl∈S
max
sk∈S
uk(sk, sl, s−k,l) = min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j),
arg max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j) = arg max
sk∈S
min
sl∈S
uk(sk, sl, s−k,l),
and
arg min
sl∈S
max
sk∈S
uk(sk, sl, s−k,l) = arg min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j) for i, j, k, l ∈ N.
They mean
max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j) = max
s j∈S
min
si∈S
u j(si, s j, s−i, j)
= min
si∈S
max
s j∈S
u j(si, s j, s−i, j) = min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j),
arg max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j) = arg max
s j∈S
min
si∈S
u j(si, s j, s−i, j),
and
arg min
si∈S
max
s j∈S
u j(si, s j, s−i, j) = arg min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j) for any i, j.
Assume (s1, s2, . . . , sn) = (s, s, . . . , s), and let s−i, j be a vector of sk, k ∈ N, k ,
i, j such that sk = s. Then, for a symmetric game Lemma 2 is rewritten as follows.
Lemma 3. Let j , i, and S i and S j be non-void convex and compact subsets of
two linear topological spaces, let ui : S i × S j → R given s−i, j be a function that is
continuous and quasi-concave on S i and continuous and quasi-convex on S j, and
assume S i = S j = S . Then
max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j) = min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j) for any i, j.
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3. The main results
Consider a Nash equilibrium of a symmetric multi-person zero-sum game.
Let s∗i , i ∈ N, be the values of si’s which, respectively, maximize ui, i ∈ N, given
s∗j, j , i, in a neighborhood around (s∗1, s∗2, . . . , s∗n) in S 1 × S 2 × · · · × S n = S n.
Then,
ui(s∗1, . . . , s∗i , . . . , s∗n) ≥ ui(s∗1, . . . , si, . . . , s∗n) for all si , s∗i , i ∈ N.
If the Nash equilibrium is symmetric, all s∗i ’s are equal at equilibria. Then, ui(s∗1, . . . , s∗i , . . . , s∗n)’s
for all i are equal, and by the property of zero-sum game they are zero.
We show the following theorem.
Theorem 1. (1) The existence of Nash equilibrium in a symmetric multi-person
zero-sum game is proved by the Glicksberg fixed point theorem.
(2) The existence of Nash equilibrium in a symmetric multi-person zero-sum
game implies Sion’s minimax theorem, and implies that the maximin strat-
egy and the minimax strategy for each pair of players coincide at the sym-
metric Nash equilibrium.
Proof. (1) Let (s1, s2, . . . , sn) = (s, s, . . . , s). Consider a function;
s → max
si∈S
ui(si, s−i), s ∈ S , i ∈ N.
s−i is a vector of sk, k ∈ N, k , i such that sk = s. This is the same function
for each i ∈ N. Since ui is continuous and S is compact, it is continuous in
s. Thus, there exists a fixed point. Denote it by s∗. Then,
s∗ = max
si∈S
ui(si, s∗−i).
s∗−i is a vector of sk, k ∈ N, k , i such that sk = s∗. This means that
s∗ = (s∗, s∗, . . . , s∗) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
(2) Let (s∗, s∗, . . . , s∗) be a symmetric Nash equilibrium of an n-person zero-
sum game. Then,
ui(s∗, s∗, s∗−i, j) = max
si∈S
ui(si, s∗, s∗−i, j) ≥ ui(si, s∗, s∗−i, j). (2)
s∗−i, j is a vector of sk, k ∈ N, k , i, j such that sk = s∗. Since the game is
zero-sum,
ui(si, s∗, s∗−i, j) + (n − 1)u j(si, s∗, s∗−i, j) = 0, j , i
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imply
ui(si, s∗, s∗−i, j) = −(n − 1)u j(si, s∗, s∗−i, j).
Thus,
arg max
si∈S
ui(si, s∗, s∗−i, j) = arg min
si∈S
u j(si, s∗, s∗−i, j).
By the symmetry of the game,
arg max
si∈S
ui(si, s∗, s∗−i, j) = arg min
s j∈S
ui(s∗, s j, s∗−i, j) = s∗.
Therefore,
ui(s∗, s∗, s∗−i, j) = min
s j∈S
ui(s∗, s j, s∗−i, j) ≤ ui(s∗, s j, s∗−i, j).
With (2), we get
max
si∈S
ui(si, s∗, s∗−i, j) = ui(s∗, s∗, s∗−i, j) = min
s j∈S
ui(s∗, s j, s∗−i, j).
This means
min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s∗−i, j) ≤ max
si∈S
ui(si, s∗, s∗−i, j) (3)
=min
s j∈S
ui(s∗, s j, s∗−i, j) ≤ max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s∗−i, j).
On the other hand, since
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s∗−i, j) ≤ ui(si, s j, s∗−i, j),
we have
max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s∗−i, j) ≤ max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s∗−i, j).
Thus,
max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s∗−i, j) ≤ min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s∗−i, j).
With (3), we obtain
max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s∗−i, j) = min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s∗−i, j).
From
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s∗−i, j) ≤ ui(si, s∗, s∗−i, j),
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and
max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s∗−i, j) = max
si∈S
ui(si, s∗, s∗−i, j),
we have
arg max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s∗−i, j) = arg max
si∈S
ui(si, s∗, s∗−i, j) = s∗.
Also, from
max
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s∗−i, j) ≥ ui(s∗, s j, s∗−i, j),
and
min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s∗−i, j) = min
s j∈S
ui(s∗, s j, s∗−i, j),
we get
arg min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s∗−i, j) = arg min
s j∈S
ui(s∗, s j, s∗−i, j) = s∗.
Therefore,
arg max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s∗−i, j) = arg min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s∗−i, j).
Next we show the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Sion’s minimax theorem and the coincidence of the maximin strategy
and the minimax strategy imply the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let s = (s, s, . . . , s). By the minimax theorem
max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j) = min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j).
Assume
arg max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j) = arg min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j). (4)
Consider the following function;
s → arg max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j).
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Since ui is continuous and S is compact, this function is also continuous. Thus,
by the Glicksberg fixed point theorem there exits a fixed point. Denote it by s˜. Let
s˜ = (s˜, s˜, . . . , s˜). Then, from the minimax theorem and
s˜ = arg max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s˜−i, j) = arg min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s˜−i, j),
we have
max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s˜−i, j) = min
s j∈S
ui(s˜, s j, s˜−i, j) = min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s˜−i, j) = max
si∈S
ui(si, s˜, s˜−i, j).
s˜−i, j is a vector of sk, k ∈ N, k , i, j such that sk = s˜. Since
ui(s˜, s j, s˜−i, j) ≤ max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s˜−i, j),
and
min
s j∈S
ui(s˜, s j, s˜−i, j) = min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s˜−i, j),
we get
arg min
s j∈S
ui(s˜, s j, s˜−i, j) = arg min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s˜−i, j) = s˜.
Also, since
ui(si, s˜, s˜−i, j) ≥ min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s˜−i, j),
and
max
si∈S
ui(si, s˜, s˜−i, j) = max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s˜−i, j),
we obtain
arg max
si∈S
ui(si, s˜, s˜−i, j) = arg max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s˜−i, j) = s˜.
Therefore,
ui(s˜, s j, s˜−i, j) ≥ ui(s˜, s˜, s˜−i, j) ≥ ui(si, s˜, s˜−i, j),
and so (s˜, s˜, . . . , s˜) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of an n-person zero-sum
game.
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Note on the case where (4) is not assumed.
Let s = (s, s, . . . , s), and define
s1 = arg max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j),
s2 = arg min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s−i, j).
Let s¯ be the fixed point of the following function;
s → s1(s).
Then, by the minimax theorem
max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s¯−i, j) = min
s j∈S
ui(s¯, s j, s¯−i, j) = min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s¯−i, j).
s¯−i, j is a vector of sk, k ∈ N, k , i such that sk = s¯. Since
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s¯−i, j) ≥ ui(s¯, s j, s¯−i, j),
and
min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s¯−i, j) = min
s j∈S
ui(s¯, s j, s¯−i, j),
we have
arg min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s¯−i, j) = arg min
s j∈S
ui(s¯, s j, s¯−i, j) = s2.
Then,
min
s j∈S
max
si∈S
ui(si, s j, s¯−i, j) = max
si∈S
ui(si, s2, s¯−i, j).
Since
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s¯−i, j) ≤ ui(si, s2, s¯−i, j),
and
max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s¯−i, j) = max
si∈S
ui(si, s2, s¯−i, j),
we have
arg max
si∈S
min
s j∈S
ui(si, s j, s¯−i, j) = arg max
si∈S
ui(si, s2, s¯−i, j) = s¯. (5)
Because the game is symmetric and zero-sum,
(n − 1)ui(s¯, s j, s¯−i, j) + u j(s¯, s j, s¯−i, j) = 0.
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Thus,
ui(s¯, s j, s¯−i, j) = −(n − 1)u j(s¯, s j, s¯−i, j).
This means
arg min
s j∈S
ui(s¯, s j, s¯−i, j) = arg max
s j∈S
u j(s¯, s j, s¯−i, j) = s2. (6)
(5) is applicable to each player other than one player denoted by j in (6). There-
fore, if s2 , s¯, there may exist an asymmetric Nash equilibrium denoted as fol-
lows.
(s¯, . . . , s¯, s2, s¯, . . . , s¯)
In which only s j = s2. Of course, Theorem 1 means that there always exist a
symmetric Nash equilibrium. Thus, in this case we have multiple equilibria.
4. Example of asymmetric multi-person zero-sum game
Consider a three-person game. Suppose that the payoff functions of players
are
pi1 = (a−s1−s2−s3)s1−c1s1− 12[(a−s2−s1−s3)s2−c2s2+(a−s3−s2−s1)s3−c3s3],
pi2 = (a−s2−s1−s3)s2−c2s2− 12[(a−s1−s2−s3)s1−c1s1+(a−s3−s2−s1)s3−c3s3],
and
pi3 = (a−s3−s2−s1)s3−c3s3− 12[(a−s1−s2−s3)s1−c1s1+(a−s2−s1−s3)s2−c2s2].
This is a model of relative profit maximization in a three firms Cournot oligopoly
with constant marginal costs and zero fixed cost producing a homogeneous good.
si, i = 1, 2, 3, are the outputs of the firms. The conditions for maximization of
pii, i = 1, 2, 3, are
∂pi1
∂s1
= a − 2s1 − (s2 + s3) − c1 + 12(s2 + s3) = 0,
∂pi2
∂s2
= a − 2s2 − (s1 + s3) − c2 + 12(s1 + s3) = 0,
and
∂pi3
∂s3
= a − 2s3 − (s2 + s1) − c3 + 12(s2 + s1) = 0.
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The Nash equilibrium strategies are
s1 =
3a − 5c1 + c2 + c3
9 , s2 =
3a − 5c2 + c1 + c3
9 , s3 =
3a − 5c3 + c2 + c1
9 . (7)
We consider maximin and minimax strategy about Player 1 and 2. The con-
dition for minimization of pi1 with respect to s2 is ∂pi1∂s2 = 0. Denote s2 which
satisfies this condition by s2(s1, s3), and substitute it into pi1. Then, the condition
for maximization of pi1 with respect to s1 given s2(s1, s3) and s3 is
∂pi1
∂s1
+
∂pi1
∂s2
ds2
ds1
= 0.
We call the strategy of Player 1 obtained from these conditions the maximin strat-
egy of Player 1 to Player 2. It is denoted by arg maxs1 mins2 pi1. The condition for
maximization of pi1 with respect to s1 is ∂pi1∂s1 = 0. Denote s1 which satisfies this
condition by s1(s2, s3), and substitute it into pi1. Then, the condition for minimiza-
tion of pi1 with respect to s2 given s1(s2, s3) is
∂pi1
∂s2
+
∂pi1
∂s1
ds1
d2
= 0.
We call the strategy of Player 2 obtained from these conditions the minimax strat-
egy of Player 2 to Player 1. It is denoted by arg mins2 maxs1 pi1. In our example
we obtain
arg max
s1
min
s2
pi1 =
3a − 4c1 + c2
9 ,
arg min
s2
max
s1
pi1 =
6a − 9s3 − 2c1 − 4c2
9 .
Similarly, we get the following results.
arg max
s2
min
s1
pi2 =
3a − 4c2 + c1
9 ,
arg min
s1
max
s2
pi2 =
6a − 9s3 − 2c2 − 4c1
9 ,
arg max
s1
min
s3
pi1 =
3a − 4c1 + c3
9 ,
arg min
s3
max
s1
pi1 =
6a − 9s2 − 2c1 − 4c3
9 ,
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arg max
s3
min
s1
pi3 =
3a − 4c3 + c1
9 ,
arg min
s1
max
s3
pi3 =
6a − 9s2 − 2c3 − 4c1
9 ,
arg max
s2
min
s3
pi2 =
3a − 4c2 + c3
9 ,
arg min
s3
max
s2
pi2 =
6a − 9s1 − 2c2 − 4c3
9 ,
arg max
s3
min
s2
pi3 =
3a − 4c3 + c2
9 ,
arg min
s2
max
s3
pi3 =
6a − 9s1 − 2c3 − 4c2
9 .
If the game is asymmetric, for example, c2 , c3, arg maxs1 mins2 pi1 , arg maxs1 mins3 pi1,
arg maxs2 mins3 pi2 , arg maxs3 mins2 pi3, arg mins3 maxs2 pi2 , arg mins2 maxs3 pi3,
and so on. However, if the game is symmetric, we have c2 = c3 = c1 and
arg max
s1
min
s2
pi1 = arg max
s2
min
s1
pi2 = arg max
s1
min
s3
pi1 = arg max
s3
min
s1
pi3
= arg max
s2
min
s3
pi2 = arg max
s3
min
s2
pi3 =
a − c1
3 .
All of the Nash equilibrium strategies of the players in (7) are also equal to a−c13 .
Assume s2 = s3 = s1 as well as c2 = c3 = c1. Then,
arg min
s2
max
s1
pi1 = arg min
s1
max
s2
pi2 = arg min
s3
max
s1
pi1 = arg min
s1
max
s3
pi3
= arg min
s3
max
s2
pi2 = arg min
s2
max
s3
pi3 =
2a − 3s1 − 2c1
3 .
Further, if
s1 = arg min
s1
max
s2
pi2 = arg min
s1
max
s3
pi3,
we obtain
arg min
s2
max
s1
pi1 = arg min
s1
max
s2
pi2 = arg min
s3
max
s1
pi1 = arg min
s1
max
s3
pi3
= arg min
s3
max
s2
pi2 = arg min
s2
max
s3
pi3 =
a − c1
3 .
Therefore, the maximin strategy, the minimax strategy and the Nash equilibrium
strategy for all players are equal.
12
5. Concluding Remark
In this paper we have shown that Sion’s minimax theorem plus coincidence of
the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy is equivalent to the existence of a
symmetric Nash equilibrium in a symmetric multi-person zero-sum game. As we
have shown in Section 4, if a game is asymmetric, the equivalence result does not
hold.
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